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RECENT CASE NOTES
Lo-rrEuEs-"BANc NIHT."--Both plaintiff and defendant operated theaters.
Defendant evolved a scheme for the giving away of cash prizes to its patrons
without extra charge to them and limited to those attending the theater.
Each purchaser of an admission ticket to the theater was given a coupon
ticket bearing duplicate numbers, one-half of each coupon ticket being dropped
into a barrel by him. At an advertised time the barrel was taken upon the
stage of the theater and tickets were drawn therefrom. The person holding
the winning ticket was given a valuable money prize. Plaintiff did not
conduct "Bank Night" in his theater. His business diminshed; defendant's
business increased. Wherefore plaintiff brought a bill for an injunction to
restrain the operation of this scheme on the ground that it was in violation
of the lottery law. Held, injunction granted.1
Schemes for the distribution of property by chance have been parading
the courts from a very early time. It is well settled that the three elements
of a lottery are: a prize, a chance, and a consideration. 2 But every time a
court has gone on record with a declaration as to what is sufficient to bring
a case within the meaning of these elements, ingenuity has evolved a new
scheme which is within the purview of the lottery statute but not quite within
the latest decision. The current scheme bears the name "Bank Night." The
operator of the "Bank Night" in the instant case concedes that two of the
elements of a lottery are present, prize and chance. But it contends that
consideration is lacking because the admission-price to the theater has not
been increased on the night of the drawing.
There is an apparent diversity of legal opinion as to what constitutes
consideration within the meaning of the lottery statutes. The dispute resolves
itself into two questions. Do the words "pay" and "valuable consideration,"
as they are used in the statutes, mean that one must dig down in his pocket
and actually hand over something of value for the chance to participate in
the distribution of prizes? Or is a consideration made out by proof that some
financial benefit results to the sponsor of the scheme through increase in
business ?
One line of authority is represented by those courts which hold that the
question of consideration depends on something of value being passed from
the participant to the sponsor.2  In these cases the participants were not
1 Sproat-Temple Theatre Corp. v. Colonial Theatrical Enterprise Inc.
(1936), - Mich. -, 267 N. W. 602.
2Lohman v. State (1881), 81 Ind. 15; People v. Cardas (1933), - Cal. -,
28 Pac. (2d) 99; Brooklyn Daily Eagle v. Voorhies (1910), 181 Fed. 579
(Dist. of N. Y.); Central States Theater Corp. v. Patz (1935), 11 Fed. Supp.
566 (Dist. of N. Y.) ; Glover v. Malloska (1927), 238 Mich. 216, 213 N. W. 107;
State v. Powell (1927), 170 Minn. 239, 212 N. W. 169; State v. Emerson
(1927), - Mo. -, 1 S. W. (2d) 109; State v. Eames (1936), - N. H. -,
183 At. 590; Carl Co. v. Lennon (1914), 148 N. Y. S. 375; State v. Wersebe
(1935), - Vt. -, 181 Atd. 299.
SPeople v. Cardas (1933), - Cal. -, 28 Pac. (2d) 99; State v. Hundling
(1936), - Iowa -, 264 N. W. 608; State v. Eames (1936), - N. H. -, 183 AtI.
590; State ex rel. v. Crescent Amusement Co. (1936), - Tenn. -, 95 S. W.
(2d) 310. See also: R. J. Williams Furniture Co. v. McComb Chamber of
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required to purchase admission tickets as a condition upon their eligibility
either to register or to claim the prizes. The courts thought that inasmuch
as any one could participate without buying an admission ticket, nothing was
added if one did in fact purchase a ticket of admission.
The other line of authority is represented by those courts which hold that
the accrual of a financial benefit to the sponsor as a result of the scheme
constitutes sufficient consideration to bring the scheme within the policy of
the lottery statutes.4 The view of these courts is that valuable prizes will
attract people to the theater who would not otherwise attend and that the
purchaser of an admission ticket receives both a ticket to the screen show
and a chance in the drawing. The scheme has been declared a lottery even
though the purchase of an admission ticket is not made a prerequisite to
registering or claiming the prize, the winning name being announced at the
door of the theater and the winner being allowed to enter gratis for the purpose
of claiming the prize.5 As to this and in answer to the foregoing contra line
of cases, it should be noted that the distribution of a few free chances should
not make a scheme any less a lottery.6
There is an array of respectable authority in support of the second view
on consideration. Suit clubs were held to be lotteries, irrespective of the fact
that the members ultimately received full value for their money; 7 the sale of
tickets to concerts, the purchasers of which were entitled to chances on prizes,
constituted a lottery even though the entertainment gave the purchasers full
value for their money;8 likewise, schemes whereby merchants gave coupons
with purchases of merchandise which entitled holders to participate in draw-
ings for prizes, constituted lotteries even though the merchandise represented
full value.0
In view of this ample precedent and of the desirable policy existing against
anything which appeals to the cupidity of the public and the spirit of gambling,
the courts should have no difficulty in declaring "Bank Night" to be a scheme
in contravention to the lottery statutes. R. H. N.
Commerce (1927), - Miss. -, 112 So. 579; Commonwealth v. Wall (1936),
- Mass. -, 3 N. E. (2d) 28.
4 People v. Miller (1936), 271 N. Y. 44, 2 N. E. (2d) 38; Society Theater v.
City of Seattle (1922), 118 Wash. 258, 203 Pac. 21; State v. Danz (1926),
- Wash. -, 250 Pac. 37; Sproat-Temple Theatre Corp. v. Colonial Theatrical
Enterprise, Inc. (1936), - Mich. -, 267 N. W. 602; Central States Theatre
Corp. v. Patz (1935), 11 Fed. Supp. 566: "It is very apparent that the increase
in attendance is from those persons who are interested in the drawing and not
in the picture, and that they have paid their entrance fee primarily in the
hope of being successful on the wheel of fortune. It may be that this number
is small in comparison to the whole, but, if it is a lottery to a few, or a lottery
comparatively small in its consideration, it is a lottery nevertheless."
5 Central States Theatre Corp. v. Patz (1935), 11 Fed. Supp. 566: "The
very purpose of the registration book being within the foyer of the theater
is to induce people to enter the theater. Also that part of the scheme which
permits a person to participate in the result of the drawing, if any, by not
being inside the theater, but on the outside, is a subterfuge, as the drawing
is at 9 o'clock at night and the percentage of people who would stand outside
and wait for the drawing at that time must be comparatively few."
6 Glover v. Malloska (1927), 238 Mich. 216, 213 N. W. 107; Featherstone
v. Independent Service Station Ass'n of Texas (1928), - Tex. -, 10 S. W.
(2d) 124 ; Commonwealth v. Wall (1936), - Mass. -, 3 N. E. (2d) 28.
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STOCK DIVIDENDS AS TAXABLE INCOME.-Il 1924 and 1926 the petitioner pur-
chased cumulative nonvoting preferred stock of Columbia Steel Corporation.
The company's articles of incorporation provided that holders of preferred
stock should receive an annual dividend of $7 a share or, at the company's
option, one share of common stock for each share of preferred. The common
stock had voting rights; and upon dissolution it was entitled to all the assets
remaining after payment of the preferred, at par, and accrued dividends
thereon. From 1925 to 1928 the company elected to pay the preferred share-
holders dividends in common stock, although it had a surplus sufficient to
pay them in cash. The company redeemed the preferred stock in 1930; and
the commissioner, in computing petitioner's profit, apportioned the cost of the
preferred stock between the preferred and the common stock received as
dividends in proportion to their respective values, thereby decreasing the
cost basis per share and increasing the gain. Held, dividends on cumulative
nonvoting preferred shares paid in common voting shares were "income"
and not "returns from capital"; and consequently, the cost of the preferred
shares cannot be apportioned between the preferred and the common shares
for determining the gain on the preferred shares.1
After the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment and the passage of the
Revenue Act of 1913, imposing income tax on dividends, 2 the question naturally
arose as to whether or not stock dividends were taxable as income. In the
leading case 8 on the question, the Supreme Court held that dividends on
common stock in the form of common stock were not income within the
meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment, hence not directly taxable as such.
However, it should be noted that such dividends are not entirely exempt
from income tax, since they are taxed upon sale to the extent that the proceeds
represent a gain over the cost. Nor can the income tax be avoided by the
' People v. Hecht (1931), - Cal. -, 3 Pac. (2d) 399; DeFlorin v. State
(1905), 121 Ga. 593, 49 S. E. 699; People v. Wassmus (1921), 214 Mich. 42,
182 N. W. 66; People v. McPhee (1905), 139 Mich. 687, 103 N. W. 174;
State v. Wolford (1921), - Minn. -, 185 N. W. 1017. See also: State v.
Emerson (1927), - Mo. -, 1 S. W. (2d) 109; State v. Lipkin (1915), 169
N. C. 265, 84 S. E. 340.
8 Thomas v. People (1871), 59 Ill. 160; Negley v. Delvin (1872), 12 Abb.
Prac. (N. S.) 210 (N. Y.).
9Lohman v. State (1881), 81 Ind. 15; Hudelson v. State (1883), 94 Ind.
426; Utz v. Wolf (1920), 72 Ind. App. 572, 126 N. E. 327; Standridge v.
Williford-Burns-Rice Co. (1918), 148 Ga. 283, 96 S. E. 498; Glover v. Malloska
(1927), 238 Mich. 216, 213 N. W. 107; State v. Powell (1927), 170 Minn. 239,
212 N. W. 169; Retail Section Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth v. Kieck
(1934), - Neb. -, 257 N. W. 493; Carl Co. v. Lennon (1914), 148 N. Y. S.
375; Market Plumbing & Heating Supp. Co. v. Spagenberger (1934), 112 N. J.
Law 46, 169 At. 660; Rountree v. Ingle (1913), 94 S. C. 231, 77 S. E. 931;
Featherstone v. Independent Service Station Ass'n of Texas (1928), - Tex. -,
10 S. W. (2d) 124. See also: Waite v. Press Publishing Ass'n (1907), 155 Fed.
58 (Dist. Mich.); United States v. Wallis (1893), 58 Fed. 942 (Dist. Idaho);
State v. Mumford (1881), 73 Mo. 647; Blair v. Lowham (1929), - Utah
276 Pac. 292. See: 48 A. L. R. 1115; 57 A. L. R. 424.
1 Koshland v. Helvering (1936), 56 Sup. Ct. 767, reversing 81 Fed. (2d) 641.
2 38 Stat. 166, 167. For the present act, see 26 U. S. C. A. 22 and 26 U. S.
C. A. 115.
3 Eisner v. Macomber (1920), 252 U. S. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521. See, also,
Towne v. Eisner (1918), 245 U. S. 418, 62 L. Ed. 372.
